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Abstract
When writing about cinema does Deleuze have a conception of cinema
spectatorship? InNew Philosophy for New Media, Mark Hansen argues
that Deleuze does have a conception of cinema spectatorship but that
the subjectivity central to that spectatorship is weak and impoverished.
This article argues against Hansen’s reductive interpretation of Deleuze.
In doing so, it relies on the three syntheses of time developed in
Difference and Repetition alongside an elaboration of Deleuze’s notion
of a ‘cinematographic Cogito’. In this way, the article offers a way of
understanding the processes of cinema spectatorship from a Deleuzian
perspective.
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Although many agree that Deleuze’s Cinema books (1983, 1985) are
groundbreaking landmarks in the history of film studies, no-one seems
quite sure what to do with them. A number of scholars have played
the game of pitting the movement-image against the time-image in an
attempt to display the superiorities of the latter, while others have gone
to great lengths to demonstrate the ways in which Deleuze’s approach to
cinema dissolves the traditional notions of unified subjectivity that were
the hallmarks of film theory in the 1970s and 1980s (see Pisters 2003;
Olkowski 1999). However, very few have tried to work out who or
what it is that engages with actual films from the Deleuzian perspective.
From Deleuze’s position, one might ask, are there spectators who go
to see (and hear) films; which is to say, can we call the experience
of watching (and listening to) a film an experience that belongs to or
which is undergone by a subject? Given Deleuze’s long-held suspicion
of notions of subjectivity, such an assertion would appear to be highly
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problematic. But if it is not a subject who experiences a film, then who
or what is it?
In New Philosophy for New Media (2004a), Mark Hansen claims
that if there is a spectator of cinema for Deleuze, then this spectator
is one who is wholly subjected to the cinema. For Hansen, if there is
a loss of subjectivity in Deleuze’s conception of a cinematic spectator,
then this is because the spectator, while in front of a film, loses
all of the defining characteristics of subjecthood. By way of contrast
with Deleuze’s cinematic spectator, Hansen claims that the subjects or
spectators of new media maintain their subjecthood. As a process of
creative interaction with new media artworks, the new media spectator
forms part of an expanded subjectivity, whereby that subjectivity grows,
is modified, and discovers new affectivities. I do not wish to take issue
with Hansen’s characterisation of new media subjectivities — that is
not my field of speciality. But I certainly do want to question his
understanding of Deleuze’s cinematic spectator. The loss of subjecthood
Deleuze’s cinematic spectator experiences should not be construed as
a negative; it is rather one of the powers of cinema. Indeed, such
losses of subjecthood are precisely what characterise the Cogito specific
to Deleuze’s conception of cinema. Deleuze’s cinematographic Cogito,
as I argue below, can be most accurately charted by virtue of the
three syntheses of time formulated in Difference and Repetition (1968).
To my knowledge, the connection between the three syntheses and a
cinematographic Cogito has not been made before, but I argue that this
connection is essential to understanding Deleuze’s approach to cinema
and of who or what it is that has cinematic experiences.
I. Against Deleuze: New Media Subjects
What, then, is Hansen’s argument? He puts forward an ingenious
hypothesis: the significance of new media does not lie in the qualities
of its objects, but rather in our responses to it. The specific qualities that
make new media new have little or nothing to do with the properties of
those media, and have everything to do with what they allow subjects
— those who encounter new media objects — to achieve. If a spectator
engages with a new media object then it is necessary for that spectator to
interact with it in order for that object’s true importance to emerge. New
media are therefore interactive; they are defined less by what I receive
from them than by what I can give to them. And according to Hansen’s
thesis, what I give to the objects of new media is affectivity.
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Affectivity, Hansen goes on to argue, is a bodily production of
excess which occurs when the body breaks its boundaries and achieves
something that it has hitherto been unable to or which it had never
before had the chance to experience. Although Hansen does not mention
video games, the example seems appropriate: when playing a video game
I have the capacity to make things happen and therefore change the
course of the game. In video games this is typically achieved by bodily
manipulating controls — various buttons and joysticks — that involve
genuinely new bodily skills, reflexes and motor co-ordinations, so that
the body extends itself in order to respond to the game. Each new game
brings with it the chance to produce new bodily skills. These are bodily
affectivities, and furthermore, I am the one who makes these things
happen; I am the one doing it. Rather than being solely at the mercy
of a technology like cinema which, according to Hansen’s argument,
leaves me no room for manoeuvring or interacting, new media give me
a role in their very coming-into-being. And my way of bringing about
this coming-into-being is by creating the kinds of bodily affectivities that
define what the new media experience is all about.
These activities also bring about a virtualisation of the body. It is as
though, when playing a video game, I am stretched between the confines
of my own bodily boundaries and the screen upon which the video game
is displayed. There is thus a virtual body, partly mine, partly the video
game’s, a novel, hybrid body which is generated by me, my movements
and activities, in the operation of bringing the video game into being.
In other words, the game cannot exist without my being there to play
it. There are thus two intertwined, essential qualities of new media:
first, its potential to generate bodily affectivities which, second, imply
a virtualisation of the body.
Hansen’s prime examples of new media objects are not of video
games, however, but of new media artworks. For example, he describes
the effectiveness of Craig Kalpakjian’s Hall as follows:
Hall (1999) is a continuous video loop of movement through a hall without
any exits, which generates in the spectator a vertiginous feeling of being
trapped in a deadly, because thoroughly generic, space. (Hansen 2004a: 210)
Hall can generate affectivities and virtualisations of the body because of
the severe discrepancy between the human world in which the spectator
is located and the technological world of the artwork. Because this
work has no ‘real world referent’ there is no way for the spectator to
relate to it in any straightforward way. There is a radical separation
between the human-subject-spectator and the new media object.
November 13, 2008 Time: 02:05pm dls024.tex
124 Richard Rushton
As such, there is no automatic connection between the subject and the
object because new media objects act in ways that block, refuse, disjoint
and confuse subjective responses. Human subjects are ‘fundamentally
excluded’ (Hansen 2004a: 223) from the space of Hall, to the extent
that Hansen describes these spaces as incompossible:
[T]his space is a radically nonhuman one, one without any analogical
correlation to human movement and perception, and one into which affection
can be introduced only from the outside, as a supplement that originates in
the embodied response of the viewer-spectator. (Hansen 2004a: 215)
As a result of this radical disjunction between the human and non-
human environments it is necessary for the spectator to generate
something else: the spectator must generate affections or affectivities,
which are, one could say, projected into or onto the artwork as a
conjunction of spectator and work, as a consequence of the spectator’s
virtualisation of her/his body. The spectator’s bodily affections must be
virtualised in order for this artwork to come into being; the virtualised
bodily affections are not produced by the artwork itself but only by what
the spectator gives to the artwork.
Hansen moves the arguments surrounding new media away from
an obsession with its objects. Instead of focussing on the aesthetic
properties, the production aspects, the materials used, the digital
programmes, or new media’s ‘virtual’ nature, Hansen focuses on the
ways we respond to and interact with such objects. New media objects
have certainly assumed particular forms, but what is really special about
them, for Hansen, is what they allow us to do.
Two main lines of argument are emphasised by Hansen. One line of
argument highlights the nature of the virtual for new media, while a
second centres on the notion of embodiment. First of all, the virtual
is no longer seen as a property of new media: the significance of new
media objects is not that they are virtual or that they create virtual
realities, but rather that they make us virtual. Secondly, the realm of
bits and digits and simulation does not make real bodies obsolete, for
the body is central to Hansen’s notion of new media. The notion of
embodiment is essential because it is the body — through its affectivities
and virtualisations — that produces a unique interaction with new media
objects. For example, from Hansen’s point of view — though, again,
this is not an example he uses — the significance of Lara Croft (the
digi-character from the video game, Tomb Raider) is not that she is an
imaginary, simulated, impossible, non-existent, unrealisable body, but
rather that such unrealisable-immaterial new media images open up new
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kinds of bodily processes for us. That is, digital images facilitate the
production of new bodily affects.
II. Old Media Subjects
If new media are new, then what are the old media against which the
newness of the new is measured? What exemplifies the old media for
Hansen is cinema. It is cinema’s treatment of the body and the virtual
that are definitively different from new media. Taking his cues from
Deleuze’s Cinema books, Hansen argues that the significance of cinema
is located entirely with its objects: films. Films function in such a way as
to exclude any activities (or affectivities) of the spectator’s body and they
also foreclose the possibility of any virtualisation of the body. Why is this
so? Films do this because their affectivities and virtualities are positioned
entirely within films themselves. There is thus no room for interaction on
the part of the film spectator: any affectivities or virtualisations are not a
result of the spectator’s interactions with a film; instead, they are wholly
determined by that film. The film spectator can only passively mirror
or receive the affectivities and virtualities that are produced by the film;
the spectator’s responses are fully determined by the film; the subject in
front of the cinema screen is fully determined by the filmic object.
The distinctions between Hansen’s new media theory and Deleuze’s
theory of cinema are therefore clear: the cinema, because it is in some
way analogical, forms an intrinsic connection between the spectator’s
faculties of perception and the represented space of the film; any
spectator is able to recognise and connect with (or ‘identify’ with, as
traditional film theory would have it) the scenes and spaces depicted by
a film. This then means that what a spectator perceives in the cinema
is a represented space that is given to him/her; the spectator has to do
nothing but receive the cinematic perceptions whose origins are external
to the spectator-subject. The spectator, for his/her part, gives nothing to
the cinematic object, for the perceptions of the cinema are external to
this spectator.
For new media, according to Hansen’s examples, the stakes are
reversed. There is a distinct lack of connection between the spectator
and the new media object and this lack of connection necessitates the
fabricating of a connection on behalf of the spectator: the spectator
must add to the new media object in order for its objecthood to come
into being. Hence, it can be posited that, and this is the important point,
the Deleuzian cinematic perceptions originate in the film-object, whereas
Hansen’s new media affectivities originate in the spectator-subject.
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Hansen’s reading of Deleuze is inadequate. He makes Deleuze’s
film theory into a straw target by construing his work in such a
way that it appears he gives everything over to the film-object. The
reality, however, is that Deleuze’s cinematic theory proposes a very
original and somewhat complex interaction between the spectator and
the screen, that is, between the spectator-subject and the film-object.
I use the word interaction here deliberately: cinema is interactive. It is
a composite of subject and object in which each determines, interrogates
and investigates the other.
III. Subjects and Objects in the Cinema
What, then, might a Deleuzian response be? Where are the subjects and
objects of cinema for him?
Minimally, it can be acknowledged that Deleuze at least makes the
claim that there are subjective, point-of-view shots in the cinema; that is,
the kinds of shots that are supposed to be from a particular character’s
point-of-view such that they depict what that character sees. But such
shots cannot be divorced from the opposite kinds of shots: objective
shots. These are shots which are from the objective eye of no-one —
the camera’s eye – rather than that of a particular character. As Deleuze
argues, even if we see a subjective shot, the only way we can know it
is subjective is by way of its emplacement within an objective system of
shots. ‘A character acts on the screen’, he writes, ‘and is assumed to see
the world in a certain way. But simultaneously the camera sees him, and
sees his world, from another point of view which thinks, reflects, and
transforms the viewpoint of the character’ (Deleuze 1986: 74). In other
words, a subjective shot is not merely a subjective shot; it can only be
designated as subjective in relation to other, objective shots.
This may not appear to be a particularly profound point to
make, except that Deleuze links this observation to what he calls a
‘cinematographic Cogito’:
Can we not find this dividing-in-two, or this differentiation of the subject
in language, in thought and in art? It is the Cogito: an empirical subject
cannot be born into the world without simultaneously being reflected in a
transcendental subject which thinks it and in which it thinks itself. And the
Cogito of art: there is no subject which acts without another which watches
it act, and which grasps it as acted, itself assuming the freedom of which it
deprives the former. (Deleuze 1986: 73)
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These lines from Cinema 1 are located amid a discussion of free indirect
discourse in the cinema and are explicitly related to the philosophical
notion of the Cogito developed by Henri Bergson in an essay on ‘The
Memory of the Present’ (Bergson 2002 [1908]). The notion of free
indirect discourse has been mobilised to a limited extent by Deleuze’s
commentators in film studies (see Rodowick 1997: 61–2), but its radical
potential has been missed inasmuch as it has not been connected to three
syntheses which, from Difference and Repetition (1968) on, form the
core of Deleuze’s thought. By suggesting specific relationships between
subjective and objective points of view in cinema, and between the
camera and characters in films, Deleuze effectively draws a map of the
way the spectator works with cinematic images and sounds.
In Deleuze’s Cinema books, there are myriad categories of filmic
aesthetics, affects and signs, but what is necessary for these categories to
be possible is an underlying assumption of the ways in which films are
watched. As Christian Metz astutely pointed out, in a different context,
what is commonly referred to as the ‘spectator’ in film theory is, for
the most part, something merely constructed by ‘the imagination of the
analyst’ of any film. (He additionally points out that many analyst-
spectators must also construct imaginary authors too, an observation
that clearly holds true for Deleuze’s analyses (Metz 1991: 760).) To
construct the kinds of categories he does, then, Deleuze must have a
notion of spectatorship which he uses to organise his writings on cinema.
As Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate in What is Philosophy?, the
Cogito is a presupposition: it functions in thought as that which comes
before thought. Deleuze’s notion of a Cogito of art bears this out. He
means that there are subjective and objective dimensions of experience:
an empirical subject cannot exist without its transcendental correlate,
and neither can a subject act without being doubled by a supposedly
‘watching’ subject that monitors those actions (the division is indebted
to Kant’s division between concepts and intuitions). The empirical
subject acts automatically, as if they were being drawn along by their
experiences, while the transcendental aspect of the subject ‘sits back’
and observes, monitors or watches the automatic, empirical aspect of
the subject.1 This is how Deleuze presupposes cinema spectatorship
works: spectatorship in the cinema is always doubled, such that there
is a dividing-in-two of the cinematic experience, so that one part of the
spectator receives and responds to images automatically, while another
aspect of the spectator monitors these automatic responses. On the one
hand, then, there is a part of the subject that is empirical-automatic,
and this aspect of the spectator is guided by the bodily senses — this
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part of the spectator is embodied. On the other hand, there is a
quasi intellectual or semi self-reflective aspect of the spectator, a
transcendental part of subjectivity which searches for the conditions of
possibility of any occurrence or act.2 If the empirical-bodily aspect of the
spectator responds mechanically and automatically then it is the task of
the transcendental-intellectual aspect of the spectator to enquire into the
conditions which make possible the bodily reaction.
This is where the first cracks in Hansen’s reading of Deleuze can be
found: Hansen works only with the first dimension of the spectator
in Deleuze, the empirical or bodily aspect. And, yes, here one can
certainly argue that the empirical-bodily spectator is, in a sense, ruled
by the images presented to it: the empirical-bodily spectator responds
automatically and mechanically — and at the same time viscerally and
physiologically — to the image. Perhaps these might be called subjective
images. But it is a very strange kind of subjectivity, a subjectivity with
no background or backdrop, and a subjectivity that lives entirely in
the present, as it were, reacting and responding only to filmic events
as they happen. If these are subjective images, then they are certainly not
images guided by a subject. Rather, they are the responses of a subject
that has lost all subjecthood, that has lost the traits of agency and self-
determination. So it may be a strange thing indeed to call these subjective
images, for they are images without a subject produced entirely by the
filmic object. It is on this level, then, that Hansen’s understanding of
Deleuze’s cinema spectator might be correct: a spectator-subject wholly
guided by the objects presented to it.
An example can help to clarify these issues. A major point of
reference in Deleuze’s discussion of subjective and objective perceptions
in the cinema is Jean Mitry’s Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema
(1963). There Mitry evocatively claims that ‘In the cinema . . . so-called
subjective impressions are presented to me — as is everything else: the
camera moves down the street, I move with it; it climbs the stairs,
I climb with it. I thereby directly experience the sensations of walking
and climbing (at least this is my impression)’ (Mitry 1997: 210). These
are clearly subjective images, as Mitry acknowledges, images that seem
to emanate from the point-of-view of a subject. Yet, as he further notes,
if these are considered subjective images, then they are not images that
are produced by a subject:
Yet the camera is leading me, guiding me; it conveys impressions not
generated by me. Moreover, the feet climbing the stairs I can see in the frame
of the image are not mine; the hand holding onto the banister is not mine.
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At no point am I able to recognize the image of my own body. Thus it is
obviously not me climbing the stairs and acting like this, even though I am
feeling sensations similar to those I might feel if I were climbing the stairs.
(Mitry 1997: 210)
Mitry therefore throws the notion of subjective images into question (he
ultimately comes up with a category he calls the ‘semi-subjective’): even
though such images appear to be those of a subject and I as a spectator
appear to be experiencing those shots subjectively, i.e., from a subjective
point-of-view, such subjective shots are always necessarily determined
by the camera. In fact, such shots are wholly determined by the camera:
any subjectivity that I may experience in respect of what I see on the
screen is imposed on me by the camera — all I can do is receive it. In this
way, so-called subjective shots in the cinema are wholly determined by
the cinematic object: they are objective images imposed on a spectator-
subject. These are subjective shots — ‘so-called subjective impressions’,
as Mitry remarks — but they have the taste of objectivity: the most
seemingly subjective shots of the cinema are those that are dictated to
me and which I cannot in any way change or interact with.
In this situation, the body of the spectator-subject is ‘acted’ (as
Bergson says) rather than ‘active’. The stakes of Hansen’s criticisms
of Deleuze are pertinent, even valid, if one restricts one’s view of
cinema to what is presented here by so-called subjective images. And
Mitry, if confined to this one example, provides us with Hansen’s view
of the cinematic experience: at all times I am guided by the camera;
I cannot affect or effect the presentations I see there, andmy body cannot
participate in or interact with the images that are dictated to me by the
screen; at the cinema I am merely a passive receptacle. And there is no
question that such a conception of the cinematic experience does exist
for Deleuze, but such a conception gives us only half the story, the half
of the story in which the spectator can be regarded as ‘empirical’. It is
this part of the subject which receives impressions imposed on it by the
cinematic apparatus: automatic, mechanical, properly receptive in the
Kantian sense. These images can be described as subjective ones, but
the kinds of subjectivity they offer are not ones produced by a subject.
And ultimately, this seems to be why Hansen has such a problem with
this kind of cinematic engagement: it amounts to a denial of subjectivity,
a foreclosure of the possible activities of the subject, an abandonment of
subjecthood. Cinematic subjectivity is here merely a kind of subjectivity
that is at the mercy of cinema’s apparatus: the screen, camera, projector,
loudspeakers, and so on.
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IV. A Transcendental Spectator
There is another dimension to the cinema spectator for Deleuze: the
transcendental aspect, that which for Deleuze is associated with the
potential for objective perception in the cinema. The best definition of
an objective perception in the cinema is, for Deleuze, a negative one:
an objective shot is one that is not subjective, which is to say, one that
is not from a particular character’s point of view. ‘We should be able
to say, in fact’, writes Deleuze, ‘that the image is objective when the
thing or the set are seen from the viewpoint of someone who remains
external to that set’ (Deleuze 1986: 71). This, then, is the first point
to take on board: it is extremely difficult to isolate objective images or
shots. Rather, any sense of objectivity can only arise from the relations
between different shots. It is a matter of finding or designating the
conditions by means of which certain shots can be read and interpreted
or understood: this is the transcendental aspect. Again Deleuze shows
his debt to Kant, for by ‘transcendental’ Deleuze means the conditions
of possible experience, the conditions which allow something to be
experienced as an experience. And these are precisely the kinds of
questions that the transcendental aspect of the spectator asks: ‘Why is
this happening?’ ‘Why did this occur?’ and so on. There is, however, a
significant difference between Kant’s approach to the transcendental and
Deleuze’s. Kant grants transcendental authority to the active processes
of the faculty of understanding (which faculty thus overrides the passive
receptions of empirical intuition) whereas, for Deleuze, transcendental
processes remain wholly passive: they are not the result of subjective
effort. Rather, they emerge without the active or conscious provocation
of the subject. In other words, these transcendental conditions happen
to the subject rather than being caused by the subject.
There are objective shots in the cinema, but any quest for objectivity,
from the spectator’s point-of-view, is accompanied by a transcendental
reflection — to reiterate Deleuze’s claim noted earlier: ‘an empirical
subject cannot be born into the world without simultaneously being
reflected in a transcendental subject’ (Deleuze 1986: 73). If we think
about the possibility of objectivity in the cinema in association with
this transcendental aspect of the spectator, what will we find? Edward
Branigan has very convincingly pointed out the necessity of a seemingly
objective relation to filmic events. When watching films, Branigan
argues, a spectator continually makes theoretical leaps between different
occurrences in the narrative and constructs vague hypotheses about what
will happen or what may have happened in order to convey upon the
filmic material some sense of structure or organisation. That is, the
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spectator tries to put the pieces of a film together in order that the events
of the film conform to some sort of potentially objective system. When a
spectator engages in such an activity, then this activity, Branigan argues:
represents a hypothesis . . . we are making about our perception of the world
of the characters as we understand that world by apparently being in it;
that is we are perceiving the world of the characters through projecting and
imagining a situation in the diegesis whereby declarative knowledge of the
relevant kind could be obtained and a description produced. (Branigan 1992:
165)
A film typically demands the construction of some kind of potentially
objective diegetic world in which the events of the film are contained
and unfold according to the expectations of that diegetic world. The
assertions that, in a film, this happened, or that happened, can only
be made in accordance with an objective, though hypothetical realm
within which the events unfold. As Branigan puts it, ‘This film’s world as
itself an object must be independent of certain angles of view’ (Branigan
1992: 165). The film’s world is defined by the specific shots (and editing
patterns) of the film as they occur, but only insofar as these shots
(or edits) are embedded in a world-as-object that the spectator puts
together. The spectator constructs objective patterns within which the
subjective material (the ‘actions’) of any film unfolds. This is what
Deleuze means by ‘transcendental’: the conditions of possible experience,
i.e., the conditions of possibility within which the events, actions,
situations and contemplations of a film occur.
Branigan adds something more: he claims that if the spectator
is intimating or inferring certain conditions of possibility, then that
spectator makes these inferences on the basis of apparently being in
this world. A fine example of this is provided in Max Ophuls’ Letter
from an Unknown Woman (1948). A young woman, Lisa, falls in
love with a concert pianist, Stefan. It is a love from afar, however,
as Stefan knows nothing of Lisa’s passionate desire for him. One day,
Lisa manages to sneak into Stefan’s apartment when he is not at
home, and she immediately makes her way to the piano which she
has heard him play so often. Branigan concentrates on the two shots
which chart Lisa’s movements towards Stefan’s piano. The first shot,
a long shot from behind Lisa, shows her at quite some distance from
the piano which is located in the background of the frame. The shot
that immediately follows, this time from directly behind the piano, now
shows Lisa standing right beside the piano. What occurs in the gap
between these two shots? Do we, as spectators, infer that Lisa has
somehow miraculously travelled twenty feet in an instant? Of course
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we do not! But we do, Branigan argues, fill in the missing time which the
edit erases.
Our anticipation is an imaginary time attributable to Lisa’s desire for Stefan
through his piano. Fixated on the piano, she advances toward it, and the
spectator completes the action; or rather, the spectator constructs a virtual
time in which the action is realized. (Branigan, 1992: 182)
This simple example of two shots can clearly demonstrate the difference
between the empirical and the transcendental aspects of the spectator
from a Deleuzian point of view. On the one hand, that which enables
the spectator to discern that the second shot occurs after the first one
is empirical: our ability to infer a direction to time from one event to
another, from the past to the future via the present, is a function of what
Deleuze calls ‘the passive synthesis of habit’ inDifference and Repetition
(Deleuze1994: 70–9), the first of the three syntheses of time which are
central to Deleuze’s philosophy. Derived as it is from notions of Kantian
intuition (though Deleuze’s most explicit reference is to Hume), the first
synthesis enables us to situate events ‘in’ time. We intuit that an edit
designates a flow of time and that during the time of this edit Lisa has
crossed the room (there is certainly no sense in which these scene, with
its potentially strange cut, is in any way difficult to understand).
But there is another dimension at work here. As Branigan suggests,
there is ‘an imaginary time attributable to Lisa’s desire for Stefan
through his piano’ (Branigan 1992: 182). There are a whole series of
conditions that make possible a deeper understanding of this filmic
situation. The relation between the two shots could be said to be
motivated by Lisa’s desire — which is to say that these shots are,
more or less, motivated by everything in the film that has preceded
them. Our remembering of Lisa’s unrequited love for Stefan and our
knowledge of her many attempts and sacrifices made to be close to him,
give Lisa’s movement from the first shot to the next an added depth.
In Deleuzian terms, this is a function, for the spectator, of the ‘second
passive synthesis of memory’: the motioning towards the conditions of
possibility of any event based upon our past experiences; the present can
only function as ‘present’ on the basis of a past which conditions it as
present (Deleuze 1994: 79–88). These are, then, as they are for Kant,
transcendental conditions.
What, then, may be said of the subjective and objective aspects of the
spectator? The empirical dimension of the spectator is not necessarily
as subjective as it might at first appear, so does this mean that the
transcendental side of the spectator is likewise not necessarily objective?
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The transcendental conditions that make possible the relation between
these two shots — conditions like our knowledge of Lisa’s unrequited
desire for Stefan — could be said to be objective insofar as one would
have great difficulty understanding the film without such conditions. But
if by objective one means elements of the film that are put in place by the
film itself without the input of the spectator — that is, things in the film
that are not determined by the subjects who experience this film — then
the claim for objectivity cannot hold. As Branigan claims, ‘the spectator
completes the action; or rather, the spectator constructs a virtual time in
which the action is realized’ (Branigan 1992: 182).3
The transcendental spectator-subject of the cinema is crucially
subjective, even if it is this aspect which offers an objective dimension
of spectatorship. These are the images or concepts of a film that simply
would not exist were it not for the fact that there is someone to watch,
listen to and make sense of them. It is nothing less than what the
spectator, at any point during the viewing of a film, adds to that film.
This is manifestly a transcendental level of understanding: what a subject
adds to the viewing experience in order to grant that experience a
potential objectivity.
It is not merely the preceding events of a film itself that add to this
transcendental level of understanding, but rather, as Deleuze would have
it, the whole of one’s past.4 This is not as mysterious as it may at first
sound, for what can it be that makes Letter from an Unknown Woman
so romantic and compelling for many viewers? Surely one reason, an
important one, is that many viewers of the film have loved from afar
and thus share a deep sympathy for the situation Lisa finds herself in.
One might even go so far as to say that an element of personal, deeply
subjective memory might, for the spectator, be said to infuse itself with
the past of the film and that it is only on the basis of such pasts that
the film could be said to be enjoyable, engaging or memorable for any
spectator (conversely, an absence of such memories might amount to
making the film entirely uninteresting for a spectator).
Would not this then be a very important form of interaction for the
spectator? Indeed, that which makes a film a film requires an enormous
amount to be given to the film by the spectator-subject. The spectactor-
subject is, as Metz put it, a midwife to the image:
I’m at the cinema. I am present at the screening of the film. I am present. Like
the midwife attending a birth who, simply by her presence, assists the woman
in labour, I am present for the film in a double capacity (though they really
are one and the same) as witness and as assistant: I watch, and I help. By
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watching the film I help it to be born, I help it to live, since only in me will it
live, and since it is made for that purpose: to be watched. (Metz 1982: 93)
V. Passions and Actions
For Hansen to claim that the cinema spectator cannot interact with films
— to imply that the spectator at the cinema is simply at the mercy of the
filmic object and automatically plays along to its tune, and that Deleuze’s
cinema spectator is therefore merely ‘the passive correlate of linkages
between images’ (Hansen, 2004a: 7) — is to grossly underestimate the
input the spectator necessarily makes to the unfolding of any film.5 And
yet, such a spectator is not at the same time necessarily active, for all of
the activities I have been describing by way of Deleuze as transcendental
are, at their foundation, passive.6 The kind of experience of monitoring
or recollecting that Deleuze attributes to the transcendental passive
synthesis of memory is one that happens to us and which affects us, but
without our necessarily consciously knowing it, and certainly without
our consciously activating it.
Again, the passivity of Deleuze’s cinema spectator can be compared
with the active new media spectator theorised by Hansen. Hansen
argues, for example, that Douglas Gordon’s post-cinematic works, such
as 24-Hour Psycho (1993), offer a ‘refinement’ of the sensorimotor
processes of classical cinema:
Unlike the sensorimotor interval at work in the cinema of the movement-
image, this refined sensorimotor interval [as exemplified by Gordon’s works]
is not immanent to the logic of the image or of film as the art of moving
images, but emerges directly from the human processing of information.
Consequently, it is a sensorimotor interval that taps the potential of the body
to exceed its own contracted habits and rhythms. (Hansen 2004a: 246–8)
In this case, then, the body asserts its activeness, an activity that emerges
‘directly’ (for reasons which are very unclear to me) ‘from the human
processing of information’, over and against what must be an inherently
inactive new media image. The body exceeds its own limits as a result of
its own activity and thus the origin of the new media object lies in the
empowerment it offers to the spectator-subject. I make the new media
world in the image of my own excess: ‘it is the viewer’s body in itself
(and no longer as an echo of the work’s “content”)’, argues Hansen,
‘that furnishes the site for the experience of [new media] “works”’
(Hansen 2004a: 31). For Deleuze, on the other hand, the cinematic
sensorimotor subject does not simply impose itself on the world in a
mode of mastery, but rather acknowledges the necessity of negotiating
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with the world and its objects — including cinematic ones — in the hope
of being able to ‘reconnect man to what he sees and hears’ (Deleuze
1989: 172). This subject is not one who is isolated from the world,
cocooned in a subjectivity that it continually tries to assert over the
world, but is rather part of a world with which it is in continual
symbiosis.
Hansen’s attempt to theorise new media in terms of our responses to
it, rather than theorise its objects, necessitates a notion of subjectivity
that actively creates or contributes to the very objects of new media:
‘the [new media] image does not comprise a representation of a pre-
existent and independent reality, but rather a means for the new media
user to intervene in the production of the “real”, now understood as a
rendering of data’ (Hansen 1994: 10). Because of this, ‘the [new media]
“image” itself has become a process and, as such, irreducibly bound
up with the activity of the body’ (Hansen, 1994: 10). Thus, the new
media image does not exist without the bodily affects that are added to
it by the spectator-participant. As a result, the new media image may be
considered fundamentally interactive and therefore a process more than
a product inasmuch as the spectator-participant’s activity is crucial to
the object’s creation and existence.
Against this conception of the spectator’s interactivity with new
media, Hansen posits the ‘old’ cinematic medium as one of immobility,
passivity, and non-interactivity (Hansen 2004a: 34). His chief target
in conceptualising the oldness of the cinematic medium is, as we’ve
seen, Deleuze, who, according to Hansen’s reading, ‘cannot account for
the primacy of the subjective dimension of the body’ (Hansen 2004a:
194). For Hansen, Deleuze’s conception of cinema is one that aims to
‘disembody the center of indetermination [by which Hansen, borrowing
from Bergson, means ‘human’] and thus free cinema to operate an
“inhuman” perception’ (Hansen 2004a: 70). According to Hansen, then,
Deleuze erases all embodiment from human subjects. As we’ve seen,
this is clearly not the case for Deleuze, for whom the body and bodily
processes of the to-ing and fro-ing of the empirical and transcendental
aspects of the spectator are fundamental to the conception of the
cinematic experience.
Hansen also charges that Deleuze erases the subjective dimension of
the body, thus bringing about the conditions of an inhumanity. Again, as
we’ve seen, it must be remembered that so-called subjective experiences
in cinema are never caused by subjects. Rather, they are subjectivities
which happen to subjects and which thus help to create those subjects
as processes. Hansen, it seems to me, regards subjects or subjective
bodies as agents: as the active causes of the processes which create both
November 13, 2008 Time: 02:05pm dls024.tex
136 Richard Rushton
new media objects, and by extension, their own subjectivities. Hansen’s
conception may thus be seen as an embodied, and hence inverted, version
of the Cartesian Cogito (‘I affect, I am’) as distinct from Bergson’s or
Deleuze’s complex Cogito.
Against Hansen’s reification of the embodied subject, Deleuze’s
conception of subjectivities — and these are subjectivities fundamental
to the cinematic experience — is one that posits them as composites
of subject and object in states of deformation and reformation which
respond to and act upon the fluctuations of empirical reception and
transcendental structuration. Against notions of ‘the subject’, Deleuze
declared a preference for terms such as pre-individual singularities or
non-personal individuations (Deleuze 2006: 351). Such individuations
are inhuman only insofar as they reject notions of isolated, self-created
and self-creating subjects who are masters of all they affect. For Deleuze,
‘Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and
which render possible both the action and the active subject’ (Deleuze
1994: 75).
VI. Clarifications
Hansen’s new media spectator adds two things to the new media object
(and these properties are those which make new media objects ‘new’
for Hansen): affection and a virtualisation of the body. These concepts
are, for Hansen, reversals of Deleuze’s cinematic notions of affection (or
‘affection-image’) and the virtual. Hansen grants the powers of affection
and the virtual to the body of the subject, whereas (on Hansen’s reading)
Deleuze makes objects the seat of affection and the virtual.7
On affection, Bergson (from whom Deleuze and Hansen borrow
liberally) does indeed claim that ‘my perception is outside my body and
my affection within it’ (Bergson 1988: 57). Deleuze confirms this view
when he writes that affection is the way the subject ‘experiences itself
or feels itself “from the inside”’ (Deleuze 1986: 65). Bergson also goes
on to argue, in Matter and Memory, that ‘Affection is, then, that part
or aspect of the inside of my body which we mix with the image of
external bodies’ (Bergson 1988: 58). And again it seems that Deleuze
agrees with Bergson that affection is ‘a coincidence of subject and object’
(Deleuze 1986: 65). No clear division is made here between subject and
object, for affection is a mixture or conjunction of the two. In his book
on Bergsonism, Deleuze even states that, as fundamental to his project,
‘Bergson shows how the lines of objectivity and subjectivity, the lines
of external observation and internal experience must converge at the
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end of their different processes’ (Deleuze 1991: 30). The all-too-clear
divisions between subject and object that Hansen relies upon are clearly
non-existent.
As for the notion of the virtualisation of the body, Hansen relies
on the same strict division between subject and object. Whereas the
virtual image in cinema consists of something ‘emanating from the
image itself’ (Hansen 2004a: 215) — that is, from its objects — the
virtualities of new media objects are ‘not images of empirical spaces’
(Hansen 2004a: 214); they are not virtualities that emerge from outside
the body; rather, they function as catalysts for the virtualisation of the
body. Thus, they are the provenance of subjects (Hansen, 2004a: 214).
Hansen’s subjects are endowed with sovereignty, while it is claimed
that Deleuze gives everything over to the cinema’s objects. Such a
view flies directly in the face of Deleuze’s explicit statement that in
cinema ‘The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective’
(Deleuze, 1989: 83).8 What Deleuze here means by the virtual can be
placed alongside his formulation of the transcendental in cinema: the
transcendental conditions of experience are virtual; they are evocations
of the past and, as such, are not actual. Certainly these designations
are not straightforward: the virtual ‘preserves the past’ (Deleuze 2002:
151) but can also be actualised in the present. At the limit, the virtual
and the actual become indistinguishable (for the cinema, this is what
Deleuze calls the time-image), though such indistinguishability only ever
occurs ‘inside someone’s head’, as Deleuze puts it (Deleuze 1989: 69).
And furthermore, the virtual is primarily passive, inasmuch as it is never
a product of consciousness, and not active (an active summoning up of
one’s past is what Deleuze calls the ‘recollection-image’, whereas the
form of memory which corresponds to a passive instantiation of the
virtual is designated, after Bergson, pure recollection (Deleuze 1989:
79–80). The virtual is not produced by consciousness, but instead
produces consciousness. It is therefore subjective, but it is a subjectivity
that happens to the subject rather than one that is caused by the subject,
‘the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought’
(Deleuze 1994: 86).
Finally, I have mentioned in detail only two of the three syntheses
Deleuze theorises in Difference and Repetition. There is a good reason
for this: I believe the third synthesis (Deleuze 1994: 88–91), is chiefly
important for the spectator of modern cinema, that is, for the spectator
of the time-image who discovers ‘a little time in the pure state’ (Deleuze
1989: 169). Insofar as Deleuze characterises the third synthesis as
‘the empty form of time’ or the ‘pure order of time’ (Deleuze 1994:
88), then the connections to be made between the third synthesis and
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the time-image are certainly suggestive. The time-image, as much as
the third synthesis, occurs when the past returns as a disruption which
realigns past, present and future. It is also the point at which any sense of
subjectivity it pushed to its limits and produces a ‘man without a name,
without family, without qualities, without self or I’ (Deleuze 1994: 90).
‘In the third synthesis’, writes Deleuze, ‘the present is no more than an
actor, an author, an agent destined to be effaced’ (Deleuze 1994: 94).
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Notes
1. These ideas are quite explicitly taken from Bergson: ‘a compenetration of states
which melt into one another and even coincide in immediate consciousness will
represent them by a duplication of the self into two different personages, one
of which appropriates freedom, the other necessity: the one, a free spectator,
beholds the other automatically playing his part’ (Bergson, 2002: 149).
2. The division between the intellect and the body is an artificial one insofar
as Deleuze does not theorise any division between the two. He states, rather,
that sensations are formed by ‘contemplation’ for example (see Deleuze 1994:
70–75), and (writing with Félix Guattari) that ‘Sensation is no less brain than the
concept’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 211), while sensations and concepts make
up the ‘first two aspects or layers of the brain-subject’ (Deleuze and Guattari
1994: 213).
3. It is worth noting that much of Branigan’s discussion refers to notions unpacked
in great detail in his Point of View in the Cinema where, for example, he outlines
his ‘reading hypothesis theory’: ‘According to a reading hypothesis theory, then,
the camera is not a profilmic object which is shifted from place to place, but a
construct of the spectator, a hypothesis about space— about the production and
change of space’ (Branigan 1984: 54).
4. As Deleuze asks, ‘The entire past is conserved in itself, but how can we save
it for ourselves? (1994: 84). Also see Deleuze’s comments on the famous cone
diagram from Bergson’s Matter and Memory (Deleuze 1989: 294, n. 22).
5. See, for example, Francesco Casetti’s discussion of cinema as ‘interface’ (Casetti,
1998: 129–30).
6. This passivity of the spectator can, from another point of view, be compared
with the ‘reactivity’ of forces Deleuze finds in Nietzsche. As for reactive forces,
any spectatorial passivity should follow the dictum to go to ‘the limit of its
consequences’ (See Deleuze 1962: 66).
7. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Rushton (2004) and Hansen’s
response (2004b).
8. Deleuze’s full statement of the issue is thus: ‘Subjectivity is never ours, it is time,
that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. The actual is always objective, but
the virtual is subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we experience
in time; then time itself, pure virtuality which divides itself in two as affector
and affected, “the affection of self by self” as definition of time’ (Deleuze 1989:
82–3).
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